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5Populations are growing older incountries throughout the world.While the populations of more
developed countries have been aging
for well over a century, this process
began recently in most less developed
countries, and it is being compressed
into a few decades. By 2050, nearly
1.2 billion of the expected 1.5 billion
people age 65 or older will reside in
today’s less developed regions.1 Just
22 percent of the world’s older peo-
ple will live in what we today call
more developed countries. This
demographic transformation will pro-
foundly affect the health and socioe-
conomic development of all nations. 
Population aging may be seen as a
human success story—the triumph of
public health, medical advancements,
and economic development over dis-
eases and injuries that had limited
human life expectancy for millennia.
But the worldwide phenomenon of
aging also brought an acknowledge-
ment by the United Nations (UN) of
the many challenges regarding aging
and national development, issues con-
cerning the sustainability of families
and the ability of states and communi-
ties to provide for aging populations.2
In April 2002, representatives from
159 nations met in Madrid to convene
the Second UN World Assembly on
Aging, two decades after the first such
assembly. During the 20-year interim
between these major conferences, the
focus had shifted from basic demo-
graphic and economic issues of aging
to the inclusion of older people at all
levels of society, a movement to
expand roles for older people, and
active aging policies. Policymakers
increasingly recognize that policies on
aging must address the entire society
and people of all ages and that global
aging needs to be integrated into the
broader process of development. The
central themes running throughout
the Madrid International Plan of
Action on Ageing 2002 fall under
three priorities:
n Older people and economic devel-
opment,
n Advancing health and well-being
into old age, and
n Ensuring enabling and supportive
environments.
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Global Aging: The
Challenge of Success
By Kevin Kinsella and David R. Phillips
Russia, like many industrialized countries, has seen its
population age because of decades of low birth rates.
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6This Population Bulletin addresses
many issues that fall under these
overarching priorities. It examines
the causes of global population aging
and considers related dimensions
such as the importance of health
improvements and extended life
expectancy for the individual well-
being of older people and for social
costs related to health care.
This Bulletin also considers
whether mounting evidence of
declining disability at older ages
answers the question: Are longer life
expectancies accompanied by better
health or simply more years of poor
health? Related to this are questions
surrounding intergenerational rela-
tionships affected by demographic
and social changes, all central to the
three priorities outlined at the
Madrid conference. How will smaller
families and new forms of familial
organization, for example, affect
social and personal support systems?
How will the labor market, pension
plans, and services adapt to longer
life expectancies, as retirees require
25 or more years of income as well
as social and other services? 
Who Is Old? 
When does someone become “old”
or “elderly”? A number of terms are
used to describe people considered
old, but there is an increasing aware-
ness that the terms used should
acknowledge the tremendous diversi-
ty inherent in a group of people
whose ages can span a range of 40 or
more years.
Some gerontologists object to the
terms “elderly” and “senior citizen”
as inadequate generalizations that
connote negative stereotypes, includ-
ing social isolation, frailty, and physi-
cal and financial dependence. At the
same time, a general term is useful
for crossnational comparisons. In
this Bulletin, “older people” and
“older population” refer to people
age 65 or older; the “oldest old”
refers to people age 80 or older,
unless otherwise noted.
The Global Process
of Aging
The world’s older population has been
growing more numerous for centuries,
but the pace of growth has accelerated.
The global population age 65 or older
was estimated at 461 million in 2004,
an increase of 10.3 million just since
2003.3 Projections suggest that the
annual net gain will continue to
exceed 10 million over the next
decade—more than 850,000 each
month. In 1990, 26 nations had older
populations of at least 2 million, and by
2000, older populations in 31 countries
had reached the 2 million mark.
Projections to 2030 indicate that more
than 60 countries will have at least 
2 million people age 65 or older. 
People usually associate the growth
of older populations with the industri-
alized countries of Europe and North
America. Indeed, industrialized
nations have the highest percentages
of older people in the world today;
before the middle of the 21st century,
some of these countries may have
more grandparents than children
under age 18. But less developed
nations also have large numbers of
older citizens—and the numbers of
older people are increasing rapidly.
Sixty percent of the world’s older
population now live in less developed
countries—an estimated 279 million
people. By 2030, this proportion is
projected to increase to 71 percent
(690 million). Many less developed
countries have had or are now experi-
encing a significant downturn in nat-
ural population increase (births
minus deaths) similar to the decline
that previously occurred in industrial-
ized nations. As the rate of natural
increase slows further, age structures
will change, and the older population
will be an ever-larger proportion of
each nation’s total population.
Measures of Aging 
Population aging is usually defined as
the percentage of a given population
age 65 or older (and sometimes the
Population Bulletin Vol. 60, No. 1 2005 www.prb.org
percentage ages 60 and older). More
than 19 percent of Italy’s population
is age 65 or older, making it the
world’s “oldest” major country. Except
for Japan, the world’s 20 oldest coun-
tries are all in Europe (see Figure 1).
The U.S. population is relatively
“young” by European standards, with
less than 13 percent age 65 or older.
The United States ranks as the 38th
oldest country. The U.S. proportion
will rise only slightly during the first
decade of the 21st century as the
early large birth cohorts of the baby
boom (born between 1946 and 1964)
approach 65. Beginning in 2011, the
aging of the baby-boom generation
will push the proportion of older
Americans to 20 percent by 2030. It
will still be lower than in most
Western European countries. 
Europe should remain the world’s
oldest region well into the 21st centu-
ry. The older share of population is
expected to more than double
between 2000 and 2030 in Asia and
Latin America and the Caribbean.
Aging is occurring more slowly in sub-
Saharan Africa, where relatively high
birth rates are keeping the popula-
tion “young” (see Table 1, page 6).
But these regional averages often
mask great diversity among and within
countries. India and Thailand may be
close geographically, but Thailand is
aging much more rapidly. Likewise,
many Caribbean nations have high
proportions of older people (the
Caribbean is the oldest of all less devel-
oped regions) compared with their
Central American neighbors. More
important, simple percentages cannot
depict the momentum of older-popu-
lation growth. Although the percent of
older population in sub-Saharan Africa
will change little between 2000 and
2015, the size of this population is
expected to jump by nearly 50 per-
cent—from 18.9 million to 28.1 mil-
lion people—as the region’s total pop-
ulation surges from 651 million to a
projected 899 million. In less devel-
oped countries as diverse as Malaysia
and Colombia, older populations are
expected to more than triple in size
between 2000 and 2030.
There are several demographic
indices of aging—the aging index,
median age, and support ratios—that
compare different portions of a given
population. One straightforward indi-
cator of age structure is the aging
index, defined here as the number of
people age 65 or older per 100 chil-
dren under age 15. At the turn of the
century, only a few countries (such as
Italy, Germany, Bulgaria, and Japan)
had more older people than youth
ages 0 to 14. By 2030, however, nearly
all more developed countries will have
a projected aging index of at least
100, and several European countries
and Japan will be in excess of 200.
Today’s aging index usually is much
lower in less developed countries than
in the more developed world, and the
pattern of future change is likely to
vary among countries. Absolute
change in the aging index will be
small if future fertility rates remain
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Italy
Japan
Greece
Germany
Spain
Sweden
Belgium
Bulgaria
Portugal
Estonia
France
Croatia
Austria
Latvia
United Kingdom
Finland
Georgia
Ukraine
Switzerland
Slovenia
United States
Percent age 65 or older
                      19.1
                      19.0
                     18.6
                    18.3
                 17.6
                17.3
                17.3
               17.1
               16.9
             16.5
             16.4
             16.4
            16.0
           15.8
           15.7
           15.7
          15.5
          15.4
         15.3
         15.1
12.4
Note: The United States ranks 38th. 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base (www.census.gov/ipc/www/
idbnew.html, accessed Dec. 12, 2004).
Figure 1
The World’s 20 ‘Oldest’ Countries and the United
States, 2004
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8relatively high. Generally, however, the
proportional rise in the aging index in
less developed countries is expected
to be greater than in more developed
countries.
The median age of country popula-
tions will increase everywhere. The
median age in most developed coun-
tries is at least 32, while the median
age in most developing nations is
below 25. By 2030, Italy and Japan are
projected to have the world’s highest
median age, with half their popula-
tions age 52 or older, largely reflect-
ing their extremely low fertility. At the
other end of the spectrum, persistent-
ly high birth rates are likely to pre-
clude a large rise in median age in
such less developed countries as
Pakistan, Liberia, and Malawi. 
Finally, social support ratios are
another widely used indicator of
broad changes in a nation’s age struc-
ture. These ratios typically indicate
the number of youths and/or older
people per 100 people ages 20 to 64,
the primary working ages. One com-
monly used term is the elderly support
ratio, also called the elderly depen-
dency ratio, and is defined here as
the number of people age 65 or older
per 100 people ages 20 to 64 in a
given population (see Box 1). In
future decades, elderly support ratios
will rise in more developed countries
because of declining fertility and
increasing longevity among their resi-
dents. The rise has been and will con-
tinue to be modest in most countries
because the large post-World War II
birth cohorts will still be of working
age through at least 2010. In the
United Kingdom, the United States,
Russia, and several other industrial-
ized countries, the elderly support
ratio will not change significantly in
the first decade of the 21st century.
Other industrialized nations, however,
are aging much faster. Between 2000
and 2015, the elderly support ratio is
likely to increase 33 percent in
Denmark (from 24 to 32) and 36 per-
cent in the Czech Republic (from 22
to 30). Nearly all European countries
will have elderly support ratios
greater than 40 by 2030. Japan’s
elderly support ratio is expected to
jump from 27 to 45 between 2000 and
2015, and to 53 by 2030. 
In countries where fertility remains
high or has just recently begun to
decline significantly—as in much of
Africa and South Asia—elderly support
ratios should change little between
2000 and 2030. Eastern and southeast-
ern Asia and parts of Latin America,
on the other hand, should experience
significant change in elderly support
ratios during that time. The elderly
support ratio is projected to at least
double between 2000 and 2030 in
many Asian and Latin American coun-
tries, and to triple in South Korea.
The Oldest Old
The older population within coun-
tries is also aging. Over time, a
nation’s older population often
Population Bulletin Vol. 60, No. 1 2005 www.prb.org
Table 1
Percent of Population in Older Ages by Region, 2000,
2015, and 2030
65 years 80 years
Region Year or older or older
Asia 2000 5.9 0.9
2015 7.8 1.4
2030 12.0 2.3
Europe 2000 14.7 3.0
2015 17.6 4.7
2030 23.5 6.4
Latin America/Caribbean 2000 5.6 1.0
2015 7.6 1.5
2030 11.5 2.5
Middle East/North Africa 2000 4.4 0.6
2015 5.5 0.9
2030 8.4 1.4
North America 2000 12.4 3.3
2015 14.7 3.9
2030 20.0 5.4
Oceania 2000 10.1 2.3
2015 12.4 3.1
2030 16.3 4.4
Sub-Saharan Africa 2000 2.9 0.3
2015 3.1 0.4
2030 3.6 0.5
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base (www.census.gov/ipc/www/
idbnew.html, accessed Dec. 12, 2004).
grows older on average as a larger
proportion survive to advanced
ages. The “oldest old” (people age
80 or older) constituted 18 percent
of the world’s older people in 2004:
24 percent in more developed coun-
tries and 15 percent in less devel-
oped countries. More than half of
the world’s oldest old in 2004 lived
in just six countries: China, the
United States, India, Japan,
Germany, and Russia.
In many countries, the oldest old
are the fastest growing segment of the
population. In the mid-1990s, the
global growth rate of the oldest old
was somewhat lower than that of the
world’s older population, a result of a
sharp dip in birth rates that prevailed
in many countries around the time of
World War I. People reaching age 80
in 1996, for example, were part of a
relatively small birth cohort. The
growth rate of the world’s oldest-old
population from 1996 to 1997 was
only 1.3 percent. Just a few years later,
however, the larger post-World War I
cohort entered advanced ages, and
the oldest age group began to swell.
Between 1999 and 2000, the growth
rate of the world’s 80-and-older popu-
lation had jumped to 3.5 percent,
considerably higher than that of the
world’s elderly as a whole (2.3 per-
cent). Demographers expect to see
this high growth of the oldest old
continue. The number of people age
80 or older is projected to jump near-
ly 50 percent between 2000 and 2010,
and another 37 percent between 2010
and 2020. In contrast, the 65-and-
older population is projected to
increase 24 percent between 2000
and 2010.
Age profiles of elderly populations
vary considerably among countries. In
the United States, the oldest old were
26 percent of all older people in
2000. This share will rise gradually
during the current decade, then
decline by 2020, and return slowly to
the 2000 level as we near 2030. Some
European nations will experience a
sustained rise in the ratio of people
age 80 or older, while others will see
an increase during the next two
decades and then a subsequent
decline. The most striking national
increase is likely to occur in Japan; by
2030, 40 percent of all older Japanese
are expected to be at least 80 years
old. Most less developed countries
should experience modest long-term
increases in this ratio.
Even when the proportion of old-
est old within an elderly population
remains stable, the absolute numbers
of this oldest group can increase sub-
stantially. In the United States, the
oldest old increased from 374,000 in
1900 to more than 10 million today.
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The standard definition of an elderly support ratio implies that
all people over age 64 are in some sense dependent on the pop-
ulation of working age (20 to 64). People ages 20 to 64 support
older people indirectly through payroll taxes and contributions
to social welfare programs. We know, however, that elderly popu-
lations have extremely diverse resources, needs, and abilities,
and that many older people are financially and physically inde-
pendent. Through their taxes, income, and wealth, older people
also fuel economic growth and provide support to younger gen-
erations. Likewise, substantial portions of the working-age popu-
lation may not earn incomes because they are unemployed,
unable to work, in school, or have opted out of the labor force.
Although it is difficult to include factors such as intrafamily
financial assistance and child-care activities in an overall mea-
sure of social support, it is feasible to consider employment
characteristics in both the working-age and elderly populations.
An alternative to the standard support ratio might, for example,
include only the economically active population in the denomi-
nator, thereby excluding people who choose not to work,
unpaid household workers, nonworking students, and individu-
als whose poor health keeps them out of the labor force. A relat-
ed alternative is to also remove economically active people age
65 or older from the numerator on the assumption that they are
not economically dependent. Economically active older people
could be added to younger economically active adults who also
contribute tax revenue.
The alternative ratios in each country are higher than the
standard elderly support ratio in most industrialized nations.
Japan is an exception—older Japanese have a relatively high rate
of participation in part-time work. Whether labor force partici-
pation is excluded or included can make a considerable differ-
ence for planning agencies that use support ratio calculations.
When data are available, these ratios also can be adjusted for
such factors as workers under age 20; the effects of unemploy-
ment; average retirement ages; levels of pension receipt and
institutionalization among older people; and the prevalence of
high-cost disabilities.
Box 1
How Useful Are Elderly Support Ratios?
Population Bulletin Vol. 60, No. 1 2005www.prb.org
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The number is projected to rise by
more than 9 million between 2004
and 2030, even though the share of
Americans age 80 or older will remain
about the same. Four-generation fam-
ilies are becoming increasingly com-
mon, and the aging of the baby boom
may produce a great-grandparent
boom in many countries. 
Prior population projections often
have underestimated the slowdown in
mortality among the oldest old, and
the number of tomorrow’s oldest old
could be much higher than now
anticipated. The actual numbers in
the highest age groups are important
for planners and policymakers
because the oldest old consume dis-
proportionate amounts of health and
long-term care services.4 In the past,
population projections for the world’s
countries often grouped everyone age
80 or older into a single, open-ended
component. Recently and for the first
time, the UN Population Division, the
U.S. Census Bureau’s International
Programs Center, and other institu-
tions are adding more age detail to
their international population projec-
tions—often up to ages 100 and
older—a reflection of the expected
growth at these oldest ages.
As longevity increases, the concept
of “oldest old” will change. While
people of extreme old age constitute
a tiny portion of total population in
most of the world, their numbers are
of growing importance, especially in
more developed nations. Thanks to
improvements in nutrition, health,
and health care, we now have the
opportunity to consider significant
growth of the population age 100 or
older. According to European
researchers, the number of centenari-
ans has doubled each decade since
1950 in industrialized countries.
Using reliable statistics from 10
Western European countries and
Japan, demographers James Vaupel
and Bernard Jeune estimated that
some 8,800 centenarians lived in
these countries as of 1990, and that
the number of centenarians grew at
an average annual rate of approxi-
mately 7 percent between the early
1950s and the late 1980s.5 Vaupel and
Jeune also estimated that the odds of
living from birth to age 100 may have
risen from 1 in 20 million to 1 in 50
for females in low-mortality nations
such as Japan and Sweden.
The Demographic
Drivers of Aging 
When asked “Why do populations
age?,” most people intuitively think of
changes in longevity. We know that
life expectancy has been rising in
most countries throughout the world,
so it seems reasonable that popula-
tion aging is an outcome of people
living longer. Yet, the most prominent
historical factor in population aging
has been declining fertility. If we
think of population aging as an
increase in the percent of people 
age 65 or older, we realize that, over
time, a decline in the number of
babies will mean fewer young people
and proportionally more people at
older ages.
Fertility—The Primary
Driver
The decrease in fertility in industrial-
ized nations during the last century
has pushed the average number of
children per woman in almost all
more developed countries below the
population replacement level of 2.1
children. Sustained low fertility since
the late 1970s has reduced the size of
successive birth cohorts and increased
the proportion of older people in
these countries’ populations. Fertility
decline in the less developed world
has been more recent and more
rapid; most regions have seen large
reductions in fertility rates during the
last 30 years. Although the aggregate
total fertility rate (TFR, the average
number of children per woman given
current birth rates) remains in excess
of 4.5 children per woman in Africa
and many countries of the Middle
East, overall levels in Asia and Latin
America decreased by about 50 per-
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cent (from 6 to 3 children per
woman) between 1965 and 1995. The
TFR in many less developed countries
is now at or below replacement
level—notably in the world’s most
populous country, China. By 2000, a
majority of the world’s population
lived in countries with near- or below-
replacement fertility.6 The UN pro-
jects that, by 2050, three of every four
of today’s less developed countries
will have below-replacement fertility.
Populations with high fertility tend
to have low proportions of older peo-
ple and vice versa. The term “demo-
graphic transition” is used to describe
a gradual process of change from
high rates of fertility and mortality to
low rates of fertility and mortality.
The process is characterized first by
declines in infant and childhood mor-
tality, as infectious and parasitic dis-
eases are controlled through expan-
sion of public health services and
facilities and disease eradication pro-
grams. This improvement in mortality
occurs while fertility is still high,
resulting in large birth cohorts and
an expanding proportion of children
relative to adults. Other things being
equal, the initial decline in mortality
generates a younger population age
structure.7
Increasing Importance of
Mortality
In countries where infant mortality
rates are relatively high but declining,
most of the improvement in life
expectancy at birth results from help-
ing infants survive the high-risk early
years of life. Reductions in maternal
mortality also contribute to increased
life expectancy at birth. As a nation’s
infant, childhood, and maternal mor-
tality reach low levels, longevity gains
at older ages become more promi-
nent contributors to increased life
expectancy.8 Most countries today are
experiencing a rise in life expectancy
at older ages, which contributes to ris-
ing life expectancy at birth. For exam-
ple, the average Japanese woman
reaching age 65 in 2000 could expect
to live more than 22 additional years,
and the average man more than 17
years. Japanese life expectancy at age
65 for both sexes combined increased
44 percent from 1970 to 2000, while
life expectancy at birth increased only
9 percent. Comparative figures for
the United States are 19 percent and
9 percent, respectively.
The speed at which death rates at
advanced ages decline will play a
major role in determining future
numbers of older, and especially of
very old, populations. The remaining
life expectancy of 80-year-old women
in England and Wales is about 50 per-
cent higher today than it was in 1950.
Hence, the number of female octoge-
narians is about 50 percent higher
than it would have been had oldest-
old mortality remained at 1950 levels.
In absolute terms, there are more
than 500,000 British women age 80 or
older alive today who otherwise would
have died if death rates for the oldest-
old had not improved.9
Until the mid-1990s, conventional
demographic wisdom held that the
human death rate increases with age
in an exponential manner. Newer
research has documented that, at very
old ages, the rate of increase in the
mortality rate tends to slow down. A
study of 28 countries with reliable data
for 1950 to 1990 found not only a
decline in mortality rates at ages 80
and older, but also a tendency toward
greater decline in more recent years.10
Other work has confirmed this tenden-
cy, and one study in the United States
suggests that the age at which mortali-
ty deceleration occurs is rising.11
There are at least two potential
explanations of this deceleration of
mortality at the oldest ages. The “het-
erogeneity” hypothesis, an extension
of the notion of “survival of the
fittest,” posits that the deceleration in
old-age mortality is a result of frailer
older people dying at younger ages,
thus creating a very old population
with exceptionally healthy attributes
resulting from genetic endowment
and/or lifestyle. A second, “individual-
risk” hypothesis, suggests that the rate
of aging may slow down at very old
ages, and/or that certain genes that
11Population Bulletin Vol. 60, No. 1 2005www.prb.org
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are detrimental to survival may be sup-
pressed.12 The observed deceleration
in mortality, combined with the fact
that human mortality at older ages has
declined substantially, has led to the
questioning of many of the theoretical
tenets of aging. Important insights are
being garnered from “biodemograph-
ic” research that attempts to crossfer-
tilize the biologic and demographic
perspectives of aging and senescence.
A clearer picture of the causes of mor-
tality deceleration at very old ages may
emerge from the study of evolutionary
biology and aging in nonhuman
species. But recognition of this slow-
down in old-age mortality—at a time
when numbers of the very old are
growing rapidly—has important policy
implications.13
Changes in Life
Expectancy
The dramatic increases in life
expectancy that began in the mid-
1800s often are thought to be the
result of medical breakthroughs. In
fact, the major impact of improve-
ments in medicine and sanitation did
not occur until the late 19th century.
Prior innovations in industrial and
agricultural production and distribu-
tion, which improved nutrition for
large numbers of people, were more
powerful forces in mortality reduc-
tions. A growing multidisciplinary
research consensus attributes the gain
in human longevity since the 1800s to
the interplay of advancements in
medicine and sanitation against a
backdrop of new modes of familial,
social, economic, and political organi-
zation.14 Life expectancy at birth in
Japan approached 82 years in 2003,
the highest level among the world’s
major countries. Life expectancy is at
least 79 years in several other devel-
oped nations, including Australia,
Canada, Italy, Iceland, Sweden, and
Switzerland. Average life expectancy
in the United States and most other
developed countries ranged between
76 and 78 years. 
Throughout the less developed
world, there are extreme variations in
life expectancy at birth. Some nations
have levels equal to or higher than
those in many European nations,
whereas life expectancy at birth in
numerous African countries is less
than 45 years. The average person
born in a more developed country
can now expect to outlive his or her
counterpart in the less developed
world by 14 years.
In some nations, life expectancy
more than doubled during the 20th
century (see Table 2). Increases in life
expectancy were more rapid in the
first half than in the second half of
the century. Between 1900 and 1950,
many Western nations added 20 or
more years to their average life
expectancy. Reliable estimates of life
expectancy for less developed coun-
tries prior to 1950 are scarce, but
changes in life expectancy in these
countries have been fairly uniform
since then. Practically all nations have
shown continued improvement, with
some exceptions in Latin America
and more recently in Africa, the latter
due to the impact of the HIV/AIDS
epidemic. The most dramatic gains
have occurred in East Asia, where
average life expectancy at birth for
the region increased from less than
45 years in 1950 to more than 72
years today.
An increasing gender differential
in life expectancy was a hallmark of
mortality patterns in more developed
countries in the 20th century, reflect-
ing the generally lower mortality of
females than males in every age
group and for most causes of death.
In Europe in 1900, women typically
outlived men by two or three years.
Today, the average gap between the
sexes is approximately seven years,
and may be as high as 12 years in
parts of the former Soviet Union.
Gender differentials tend to be small-
er (between three and six years) in
less developed countries, and are
reversed in a few South Asian and
Middle Eastern societies in which
such cultural factors as low female
social status and a preference for
male rather than female offspring
affect female life expectancy. 
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Changing Age Structure 
Populations begin to age when fertil-
ity declines and adult mortality rates
improve. Successive birth cohorts
eventually become smaller, although
the trend may be interrupted by
“baby-boom echoes” as women of
prior large birth cohorts reach child-
bearing age. International migration
usually does not play a major role in
the aging process, but can be impor-
tant in smaller populations. Some
Caribbean nations, for example,
have experienced a combination of
emigration of working-age adults,
immigration of retirees from other
countries, and return migration of
older former emigrants; all three
factors contribute to population
aging. Many observers expect inter-
national migration to assume a more
prominent role in the aging process,
particularly in “older” countries
where persistently low fertility has
led to stable or even declining popu-
lation size.15
Most if not all countries once had
a youthful age structure similar to
that of less developed countries as a
whole in 1950, with a large percent-
age of the entire population under
age 15. Given the comparatively high
rates of fertility that prevailed in most
less developed countries from 1950
through the early 1970s, the pyrami-
dal shape of the age and sex profile
of less developed countries had not
changed greatly by 1990 (see Figure
2, page 12). However, the effects of
fertility and mortality decline can be
seen in the projected age-sex pyramid
for 2030, which loses its strictly trian-
gular shape as the size of younger
five-year cohorts stabilizes and the
older portion of the total population
increases.
The picture in more developed
countries has been and will be quite
different. In 1950, there was relative-
ly little variation in the size of five-
year groups between the ages of 5
and 24. The beginning of the post-
World War II baby boom can be
seen in the 0-to-4 age group. By
1990, the baby-boom cohorts were
ages 25 to 44, and younger cohorts
were successively smaller. If project-
ed fertility rates are reasonably accu-
rate through 2030, the aggregate
pyramid will start to invert, with
more weight on the top than on the
bottom, and the size of the oldest-
old population (especially women)
will increase substantially.
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Table 2
Life Expectancy at Birth in Years, Selected 
Countries, 1900, 1950, and 2003
Circa 1900 Circa 1950 Circa 2003
Region/country Male Female Male Female Male Female
More developed countries
Western Europe
Austria 38 40 63 68 75 81 
France 45 49 64 70 75 83
Sweden 53 55 70 73 78 83
United Kingdom 46 50 67 72 76 81
Southern and eastern Europe
Hungary 37 38 62 66 68 76
Italy 43 43 64 68 76 82
Spain 34 36 62 66 76 83
Other
Australia 53 57 67 72 76 82
Japan 43 44 60 63 78 85
United States 48 51 66 72 74 80
Less developed countries
Africa
Egypt — — 41 44 67 71
Ghana — — 40 44 57 59
Mali — — 31 34 48 49
South Africa — — 44 46 45 51
Uganda — — 39 42 45 47
Asia
China — — 39 42 69 73
India — — 39 38 63 65
Kazakhstan — — 52 62 61 72
South Korea — — 46 49 72 79
Syria — — 45 47 71 73
Latin America
Argentina — — 60 65 71 78
Bolivia — — 39 43 62 66
Brazil — — 49 53 64 73
Costa Rica — — 56 59 76 81
Mexico — — 49 52 70 76
— Not available.
Note: Average number of years a person born in those years could expect to live.
Source: UN Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision (2003);
and G. Siampos, Statistical Journal of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 7,
no. 1 (1990): 13-25.
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Emergent Diversity
Demographers have long known that
the world was aging because of
declines in birth rates and increases
in adult life expectancy. On the tradi-
tional path toward population aging,
however, a number of unexpected
boulders have surfaced. Scientists
have been surprised by the speed of
aging in some parts of the world, by
unforeseen developments in mortality
change, and by the emergence or
reemergence of diseases. While differ-
ences in the levels of population
aging between more developed and
less developed countries have been
obvious for some time, several devel-
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More developed countries
Figure 2
Population Age-Sex Structure in Less Developed and More Developed Countries, 
1950, 1990, and 2030
Less developed countries
Source: UN Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision (http://esa.un.org/unpp, accessed Dec. 9, 2004).
opments have added new wrinkles to
what was once expected to be a
monotonic march toward aging. 
Compression of Aging
One of the most surprising demo-
graphic developments in the last two
decades has been the pace of fertility
decline in many less developed coun-
tries. The common perception is that
below-replacement fertility levels are
seen only in the industrialized nations
of the Northern Hemisphere. As of
2002, however, the TFR was below
replacement level in 33 less developed
countries—mostly in Latin America
and the Caribbean and parts of Asia—
and is declining steeply in many oth-
ers. The demographic effects of fertili-
ty decline have been most dramatic in
some highly populous Asian countries
because of the rapidity of the decline
in these countries. 
Aging has proceeded more gradu-
ally in Western nations. It took 115
years for the proportion of France’s
population age 65 or older to
increase from 7 percent to 14 percent
(see Figure 3). Most other more
developed nations have had many
decades to adjust to this structural
change. Japan is the major exception,
where this same increase occurred in
just 26 years. A similarly rapid trajec-
tory is underway elsewhere in East
and Southeast Asia (especially China,
South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand),
fueled by dramatic and relatively
recent drops in fertility. Such rapidly
aging non-Western societies are
beginning to engage in the same
debates about public pension and
health care costs that have become
common in Europe and North
America.
The People’s Republic of China
illustrates how rapidly declining fertil-
ity affects population aging. China’s
TFR plummeted from about 6.0 in
1965 to near-replacement level by
1990 and to 1.7 by 2002. The decline
was reinforced by strict birth planning
policies enacted in the late 1970s.
Consequently, China will age sooner
and more quickly than most less
developed countries. China’s age pro-
file in 2002 contained a large “bulge”
consisting of people ages 28 to 39.
The oldest people in this age bulge
will be entering their 60s just prior to
2025, signaling a rapid aging of the
Chinese population in the third and
fourth decades of the 21st century.
The number of Chinese ages 65 and
older is projected to swell from 88
million in 2000 to 199 million in
2025—and to 349 million in 2050,
barring a catastrophic rise in adult
mortality or massive emigration.
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Note: Dates show the span of years when percent of population age 65 or older rose (or is projected to rise) from 7 percent to 14 percent.
Source: K. Kinsella and Y.J. Gist, Older Workers, Retirement, and Pensions: A Comparative International Chartbook (1995); and authors’ calculations.
Figure 3
Speed of Population Aging in Selected Countries
Number of years required or expected for percent of population age 65 or older to rise from 7% to 14%
Population Bulletin Vol. 60, No. 1 2005www.prb.org
16
Recognizing this near-certain surge,
the central Chinese government and
various local governments are strug-
gling to establish alternative forms of
pensions to provide for what is still a
predominantly rural nation. Some
analysts and policymakers are calling
for an easing of birth restrictions to
slow the pace of aging.
Slow Structural Aging
In stark contrast to the rapidity of
aging in other parts of the less devel-
oped world, most of sub-Saharan
Africa remains in an intermediate
stage of demographic transition.
Fertility and mortality rates are quite
high by global standards, and the
regional age structure is changing
only gradually. Women in sub-
Saharan Africa still bear nearly 5.5
children on average, compared with
2.8 in North Africa and 2.4 in Asia.
Although infant and maternal mortal-
ity are also comparatively high, the
large numbers of babies born each
year ensure that the base of sub-
Saharan Africa’s population pyramid
will remain quite broad. At the same
time, life expectancy at birth for the
region is approximately 50 years, 13
years below the average for all less
developed countries. The scourge of
HIV/AIDS has pushed average life
expectancy below 40 years in some
sub-Saharan nations. “Old age” in
Zimbabwe or Mali has a very different
chronological interpretation than in
Switzerland or Japan.
The proportion of older people in
Africa is expected to increase only
modestly in the coming decades,
although the absolute number of
older people will rise steeply. While
aging as a sociopolitical issue is not a
high priority for most African govern-
ments, there are unique features of
many African societies that bear
directly on older people. One is the
impact of HIV/AIDS (discussed
later), which thrusts older adults back
into the role of primary child
providers. Another is the rapidly
growing number of widows and the
role that polygyny may play in their
well-being or lack thereof. Also, sub-
Saharan Africa is the most rapidly
urbanizing world region, and the
implications of migration patterns for
the well-being of older Africans are
not well understood.
Aging and Depopulation 
The world is witnessing a new and
unprecedented demographic phenom-
enon: simultaneous population aging
and an overall decline in the total size
of some national populations (see Box
2). European demographers have
sounded warning bells for at least 30
years about the possibility of declining
population size in industrialized
nations. But this idea had not resonat-
ed in public discourse until recently.
Many in these societies were aware that
their populations were aging, but they
often did not equate aging with popu-
lation decline. In the last several years,
the awareness of potential population
decline has increased considerably, in
large part because of reports suggest-
ing that populations in much of
Europe and Japan will decrease in size
over the next 50 years, and because of
publicity generated by recent actual
population declines in Spain, Italy,
Russia, and other nations.
Projections to 2030 suggest that 11
countries are expected to lose at least
1 million people within 30 years.
Russia tops the list with a projected
decline of 12 million, followed by
Japan with 11 million. Not all popula-
tion declines will result from persis-
tently low fertility. South Africa is pro-
jected to have 10 million fewer citizens
in 2030 than it does today because of
HIV/AIDS mortality. By and large,
however, aging and depopulation will
be a European phenomenon.
Divergence in Life
Expectancy
In the 1950s, female life expectancy
continued its rise everywhere, but
gains among males slowed significant-
ly and in some cases leveled off. From
the early 1950s to the early 1970s, for
example, male life expectancy
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changed little in Australia, the
Netherlands, Norway, and the United
States, before resuming a modest
increase.
In eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union, advances in living condi-
tions and public health policies pro-
duced large declines in mortality in
the 1950s and early 1960s. Some major
causes of death, such as tuberculosis,
were reduced to minimal levels. Gains
in life expectancy in excess of five
years per decade were common. The
rate of increase in life expectancy fell
sharply in the mid-1960s, however.
Changes in female life expectancy at
birth were erratic during the next two
decades, while male life expectancy
fell throughout the region. The politi-
cal and economic collapse of the for-
mer Soviet Union undermined public
health and led to severe declines in
life expectancy, especially for Russian
men. Between 1987 and 1994, life
expectancy at birth for Russian males
plunged 7.3 years to 57.6 years and has
not fully recovered. The large increas-
es in adult male mortality usually are
attributed to a combination of factors,
including increased homicide and
accident rates, excessive alcohol con-
sumption, poor diet, and environmen-
tal/workplace degradation.16 Research
on indicators of social capital in
Hungary suggests that gender differ-
ences in social support systems also
play a role; support systems for men
appear strained by changes in
Hungarian society, while traditionally
close-knit networks among women
remain relatively unchanged.17
In parts of Africa, the HIV/AIDS
epidemic has devastated life expectan-
cy at birth, reflecting the concentra-
tion of AIDS deaths there in child-
hood and the middle adult ages. U.S.
Census Bureau projections to the year
2010 imply that AIDS will reduce life
expectancy at birth by more than 30
years from otherwise-expected levels in
17
Is persistent below-replacement fertility a threat to
European and other societies, and if so, how might it
be altered? Should so-called “replacement migra-
tion” be encouraged to offset population aging?
There are no straightforward answers to these
questions. A number of theories attempt to explain
modern-day levels of low fertility, focusing on con-
cepts such as risk aversion, materialist values, and
gender equity.1 One study that examined a diverse
set of countries that have made the transition to low
fertility found very few countries in which fertility sta-
bilized above two children per woman.2 Such an
occurrence would require substantial proportions of
third or higher-order births, but higher-order births
are largely anachronistic in industrial-country set-
tings. The tentative conclusion was that fertility is
unlikely to rebound significantly, though we should
remember that few demographers anticipated the
post-World War II baby boom that will soon acceler-
ate population aging.
Governments in low-fertility countries have
employed various means to increase fertility, includ-
ing direct financial incentives for additional births;
tax reductions; indirect pension (early retirement)
or in-kind benefits such as preferential access to sub-
sidized housing; more liberal maternity and paternity
leave and childcare arrangements; and legislation
promoting gender equity in employment. These
policies have had modest impacts in authoritarian
states, but only minimal impacts in liberal democra-
cies such as France and Sweden.3
In 2000, a United Nations study concluded that
immigration was not a realistic counterbalance to
aging for avoiding population decline.4 UN experts
found that immigration could buffer the impact of
aging if used by governments in conjunction with
other policies, such as measures to encourage higher
fertility or to increase labor force participation, espe-
cially among women. 
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Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, and
Zimbabwe. The epidemic also can
have a significant impact on older pop-
ulations. In the United States in 2000,
the HIV-death rate among people ages
65 to 74 was more than four times as
high as among youth ages 15 to 24.18
Intranational Differences
In addition to global and regional dif-
ferences in aging, important differ-
ences may play out within nations as
well. Census data for Brazil show that,
while the overall national aging index
was 14 in 1991, the index ranged
from less than 6 in several northern
states to 21 in the state of Rio de
Janeiro. In the United States, more
than one-third of the population in
some counties is age 65 or older. In
2003, 17 percent of Florida’s residents
were at least 65 years old. 
In many countries, older people
are becoming concentrated in rural
areas as young adults leave rural areas
for the cities and some older urban
migrants return to rural communities
as they reach old age. Older women
are more likely than older men to live
in rural areas, causing an imbalanced
age-sex distribution. In the Russian
region of Kursk, for example, nearly
31 percent of rural females are age 65
or older, compared with just 15 per-
cent of rural males. 
Skewed age structures complicate
the provision of services for older
people in some localities. Based on
the experiences of Japan and Korea,
demographer Ronald Skeldon has
noted that overall population aging
coincides with rural depopulation
and population stagnation in small-
and medium-sized towns, and sug-
gests that this pattern will increasingly
be seen throughout Asia in the first
half of this century.19 A similar phe-
nomenon has been identified in
Italy.20 While few if any negative
national economic consequences are
associated with the concentration of
older people in rural communities,
social conditions in relatively isolated
rural areas are likely to require
increasing attention by policymakers.
Health Transitions
The global phenomenon of popula-
tion aging is directly related to a fun-
damental health transition that has been
occurring throughout the world at dif-
ferent rates and along different paths.
The health transition—also called the
epidemiological transition—is defined by
a broad set of changes that include a
shift from high to low fertility, steady
expansion of life expectancy at birth
and at older ages, and a transition
from the predominance of infectious
and parasitic diseases to the growing
importance of noncommunicable dis-
eases and chronic conditions. The
health transition has been linked to
modernization and urbanization, espe-
cially improvements in standards of liv-
ing and education. As Russia’s recent
erosion in life expectancy illustrates,
health transition gains can be lost as
national economies and public ser-
vices stagnate and even regress
because of social, political, or econom-
ic upheavals. 
The health transition is allied with
the demographic transition that began
in more developed countries during
the 18th and 19th centuries as popu-
lations shifted from high to low mor-
tality, thanks to better health and
nutrition. As death rates fell, popula-
tion growth surged until birth rates
dropped, eventually falling close to—
or even below—the level of death
rates. This transition took at least 100
years in most of Europe and the
United States. While many less devel-
oped countries have not completed
the transition to low birth and death
rates and slow population growth,
many have passed through some of
the same stages of falling mortality,
rapid population growth driven by
high fertility, and then falling fertility
and slower population growth.
The epidemiological transition was
originally conceptualized as a three-
stage process that paralleled the later
stages of demographic transition. An
Age of Pestilence and Famine was suc-
ceeded by an Age of Receding
Pandemics and then an Age of
Degenerative and Man-Made
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Diseases. A fourth stage has been rec-
ognized in recent decades—a hybrid
stage in which some social and geo-
graphic factors affect the health of
specific population groups. Behaviors
and lifestyle obviously influence
health status, and health practitioners
are increasingly concerned about ris-
ing ill health and mortality from what
are sometimes called social patholo-
gies: cirrhosis, substance abuse, obesi-
ty, suicide, homicide, HIV/AIDS, and
resurgent diseases such as drug-resis-
tant tuberculosis and other strains of
infectious diseases. New emerging
infectious disease variants can be
especially risky for older people, who
are more vulnerable than younger
people to acute respiratory diseases.
For example, the outbreak in many
countries in 2003 of SARS (severe
acute respiratory syndrome) affected
older people disproportionately. In
Hong Kong, people ages 65 and older
accounted for 19 percent of the
reported 1,755 SARS cases in 2003.
More important, the older population
was hit much harder with fatalities in
the epidemic; nearly two-thirds of the
300 SARS deaths in Hong Kong were
among older people.21
While communicable diseases still
exact a toll—especially among older
people—the broad decline in mortali-
ty from infectious diseases and the ris-
ing importance of chronic diseases
has delayed deaths until older and
older ages. The epidemiological tran-
sition shifts the human survival curve
that depicts people’s chance of surviv-
ing another year as they age. In a so-
called “wild” survival curve that likely
characterized nonindustrial, pre-
demographic transition societies, the
risk of death remains relatively con-
stant throughout life, and only a small
proportion of those born reach old
age. Modern survival curves, particu-
larly in highly industrialized societies,
are much more rectangular, as most
people live past middle age and
deaths are highly concentrated at
older ages (see Figure 4). The UN cal-
culates that, for more developed coun-
tries, 86 percent of people born today
will survive to age 60 (91 percent for
females, 81 percent for males); almost
one-half of people born today can
expect to reach age 80.
How healthy can these older peo-
ple be? This question underlies one
of gerontology’s great debates and
has generated varied attempts to
quantify the health of older people.
The answers have important policy
implications because they influence
the health and social care needs and
residential options for older people. 
The health profile of older people
spans a wide spectrum: Some people
live long and healthy lives, while others
experience the “creaking door” syn-
drome of longer life but gradually
deteriorating health. Most analysts
think that some combination of genet-
ic factors and lifestyle explains much
of the variation in health at older ages.
While some people operate at full
capacity into very old age, many older
people begin to have difficulty with at
least some common daily activities.
When do such difficulties become so
limiting that an individual is consid-
ered disabled or handicapped? The
definition is not always clear-cut, but it
is important on a variety of levels.
Measuring Disability
Disability is often visualized as a
process, as depicted in Figure 5, page
18. Many analysts claim this model
19
Figure 4
Stylized Wild and Modern Survival Curves
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oversimplifies the complexity of dis-
ability and function. In its
International Classification of
Impairments, Disabilities and
Handicaps (ICIDH), the World Health
Organization (WHO) takes the model
a step further, proposing three possi-
ble outcomes of disease: impairment,
disability, and handicap. Impairment
refers to the performance of an organ
or part of the body, whereas disability
refers to the performance of an activity
by a person. Not all impairments will
lead to disability, such that a function-
ally limited person may still be able to
carry out all normal activities indepen-
dently. The distinction between disabil-
ity and handicap is determined by
severity and situation. WHO considers
a handicap to be a disadvantage due to
an impairment or disability that limits
or prevents a person from fulfilling a
normal role. There is wide internation-
al variation in the definition and appli-
cation of the ICIDH concepts.22
However, the framework is useful for
assessing how assistance (either per-
sonal or mechanical) can prevent a
disability from becoming a handicap
that, for example, prevents a person
from fulfilling the role of a spouse or
grandparent.
More specific measures of the
range of disability a person might
experience are used to assess needs
for medical care and general assis-
tance. Two widely used (but imper-
fect) means of measuring a person’s
difficulty in performing personal care
and home management tasks are
ADLs (Activities of Daily Living) and
IADLs (Instrumental ADLs). ADLs
gauge the extent to which a person
can manage personal care activities
such as eating, moving from a bed or
chair, bathing, dressing, toileting, and
walking. IADLs refer to home man-
agement activities such as using the
phone, shopping, dealing with per-
sonal finances, and light housework.
These measures assess the ability of
people (older people in particular) to
live independently; they are also used
to indicate the need for health and
social services. Results from the sever-
al types of ADL and IADL scales used
to estimate disability prevalence—
including Katz, Barthel, and Pulses—
can differ by as much as 60 percent.23
By any measure, however, ADL and
IADL problems increase with age.
Data from the Berlin Aging Study
showed that, among people ages 70 to
84, 9 percent needed help with
bathing, 6 percent needed help
climbing stairs and going for walks,
and 4 percent needed help with
dressing. In the 85-and-older age
group, 46 percent needed help with
bathing, 33 percent with climbing
stairs, 34 percent with going for walks,
and 18 percent with dressing.
Roughly 20 percent of the younger-
old needed assistance with shopping
and transportation, while more than
70 percent of people age 85 or older
either needed help with or were
unable to do these activities.24
There is no simple correlation
between disability-free life expectancy
and life expectancy. International dis-
ability figures often are not compara-
ble because of differences in defini-
tions, concepts of disability, and com-
putational methods. Even within
Europe, countries show wide variations
in self-reported levels of severe or any
disability. For example, against a stan-
dardized relative risk of severe disabili-
ty of 100 for the older populations in
eight countries, the United Kingdom
and Denmark had a risk of around 70
while the level in France exceeded
140. Life expectancy at age 65 in the
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Figure 5
Progression of Disability
Several
measures of
disability for
older Americans
have shown
improvement.
United States and the United Kingdom
is similar, but rates of disability appear
much lower in the United Kingdom;
consistent with this disparity, the per-
centage of the population 65 or older
receiving formal home care is almost
three times higher in the United
States. However, the percentage of
overall expenditure on home care as a
proportion of gross domestic product
(GDP) is similar in the two countries.25
One international effort to harmonize
disability measures indicates that, in
most countries, the expectation of life
without severe disability for older peo-
ple is gradually increasing and some-
times at a similar rate to increases in
life expectancy.26 A rigorous review of
eight surveys in the United States con-
cluded that several measures of disabil-
ity for older Americans have shown
improvement in the past decade.27 Less
developed countries eye disability data
from the more developed world with
interest, as many countries are rapidly
catching up in life expectancy but have
little insight into the health of their
older populations. Even if rates of dis-
ability can be reduced or the onset
postponed, demographic trends will
almost inevitably increase the numbers
of disabled older people in less devel-
oped countries, especially when the
numbers with dementia are included
(see Box 3).
Compression of Morbidity 
Related to the discussion of changing
incidence and prevalence of disability
is the debate on “compression of mor-
bidity,” which was articulated by James
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Dementia is a growing concern around the world as
populations age. Dementia is an acquired syndrome
that eventually destroys memory, reasoning, speech,
and other cognitive functions. A crossnational study
conducted by the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) found that
dementia affected about 10 million people in OECD
member countries, just under 7 percent of people age
65 or older. But the prevalence increases sharply with
age and threatens to transform dementia into a
health care crisis in the world’s aging populations.1
Dementia prevalence estimates vary considerably
internationally, in part because of variations in diag-
noses and reporting systems. The syndrome is not
easy to diagnose, especially in its initial stages. The
memory problems, misunderstandings, and inappro-
priate behavior common in the early and intermedi-
ate stages are often attributed to normal effects of
aging, accepted as personality traits, or simply
ignored. Many cases remain undiagnosed even in
the intermediate, more serious stages.
Alzheimer’s disease (AD) is the most common
form of dementia. AD accounted for between two-
fifths and four-fifths of all dementia cases in the
OECD study. The prevalence of AD and other demen-
tias is very low at younger ages but increases with age;
the prevalence nearly doubles with every five years of
age. In the OECD study, for example, dementia affect-
ed fewer than 3 percent of those ages 65 to 69, but
almost 30 percent of those ages 85 to 89. Among
women age 90 or older, more than 50 percent had
dementia in France and Germany; corresponding lev-
els were around 40 percent in the United States and
just under 30 percent in Spain. 
There are no effective treatments for dementia.
Family members often play a key part in the care,
especially in the initial stages of what is often a rela-
tively slow and distressing decline in a loved one. The
complexity of the disease and the wide range of fami-
ly and housing settings can make helping people and
families with dementia very difficult. However, it is a
challenge that must be faced in health and social care
worldwide, especially with increasing numbers of peo-
ple surviving past age 85. While industrialized coun-
tries have struggled to cope with the mounting finan-
cial and social burdens of AD, the challenge is even
greater in the less developed world, where at least
two-thirds of dementia sufferers are thought to live
but where far fewer coping resources are available.2
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Fries and others in the 1980s.28
Projections of future burdens of ill-
ness depend on which of two contrast-
ing scenarios may hold true. In the
first, average life expectancy at birth
increases, but the average age at
which a person becomes chronically
ill does not. In the second scenario,
life expectancy increases, and the
average age of the onset of chronic ill-
ness also rises. 
In the extreme, chronic illness
occurs only in the final years or even
months of life. This extreme scenario
is known as the compression of morbidi-
ty. Data from the United States lend
some support to the compression of
morbidity hypothesis: The rate of
chronic disability among older
Americans declined between 1982
and 1999, and there were 25 percent
fewer chronically disabled older
Americans than there would have
been if the U.S. disability rate had
not changed since 1982.29 If health
improves alongside mortality (that is,
if there is a compression of morbidi-
ty), health and social welfare costs
will be very different than they would
be if disability rates do not fall. In
most countries, however, the shortage
of data on disability across time, on
social groups, and by generation and
age greatly hamper attempts to
understand the causal factors that
underlie these changes.
The Global Burden of
Disease 
In a landmark study in the 1990s, the
WHO, World Bank, and Harvard
University attempted to estimate the
current and future global burden of
major diseases. This Global Burden of
Disease project has been extended to
look at the burden of disease and
aging.30 Earlier results from the study
indicate that, between 1990 and 2020,
the leading causes of disease burden
in the world as a whole will shift from
lower respiratory conditions, diar-
rhoeal diseases, and perinatal condi-
tions to ischemic heart disease, unipo-
lar major depression, and road traffic
accidents (see Table 3). The study also
projects that cerebrovascular disease
will make its way up the list, and that
HIV will reach the top 10 leading caus-
es of disease burden by 2020. These
trends—especially the increased
impact of mortality and morbidity
from HIV/AIDS—will have important
implications for older people and their
families (see Box 4).
While the Global Burden of Disease
study has attracted criticism, it has
clearly prompted a valuable analysis of
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Table 3
Ten Leading Sources of the Global Burden of 
Disease, 1990 and 2020
Rank 1990 Disease or injury 2020 Disease or injury
1 Lower respiratory infections Ischemic heart disease
2 Diarrhoeal diseases Unipolar major depression
3 Conditions arising during the perinatal period Road traffic accidents
4 Unipolar major depression Cerebrovascular disease
5 Ischemic heart disease Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease
6 Cerebrovascular disease Lower respiratory infections
7 Tuberculosis Tuberculosis
8 Measles War
9 Road traffic accidents Diarrhoeal diseases
10 Congenital anomalies HIV/AIDS
Note: These estimates of disease burden as measured by disability-adjusted life years are from the Global Burden of Disease
Study conducted by the World Health Organization, the World Bank, and Harvard University in the 1990s. Many countries and
agencies have modified the study methodology; further refinements are being tested in a project spearheaded by the Harvard
University Burden of Disease Unit. More information is available at www.hsph.harvard.edu/organizations/bdu/About.html.
Source: C.J.L. Murray and A.D. Lopez, eds., The Global Burden of Disease (1996).
disease factors and health system
responses. One important component
of older people’ living standards is
health care and its costs. As costs have
escalated in the past decade, a growing
body of research has focused on iden-
tifying the costs of specific illnesses
and on projecting health expendi-
tures.31 The WHO’s World Health Report
2002 was devoted to identifying, quan-
tifying, and reducing disease risk fac-
tors. Data from the European
Community Household Panel Survey
in the 1990s began to shed light on
the interplay between health status
and the retirement decisions of older
European couples. Several ongoing
national longitudinal studies, includ-
ing the Health and Retirement Study
in the United States and the English
Longitudinal Study of Ageing in the
United Kingdom, also attempt to cap-
ture the complexity of such transitions
and understand their significance for
policy planning. Several other nations
have mounted similar longitudinal
studies to track these issues.
Gender and Aging
Women constitute a majority of the
older population in almost every
country, and their majority increases
with age. The gender imbalance at
older ages has many implications for
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The World Health Organization (WHO) and the Joint
United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS)
estimated that 18.8 million people had died of AIDS
by 2001. Of these, 14.8 million were in sub-Saharan
Africa. An estimated 37 million people were living
with HIV, and 95 percent of new infections were
occurring in less developed countries.1 The rising
AIDS toll and the consequent increasing numbers of
AIDS orphans worldwide are having far-reaching
health, economic, and psychosocial impacts, particu-
larly in Africa and increasingly in parts of Asia. Of the
14 million children under age 15 who had lost their
mother or both parents to AIDS, about 90 percent
lived in sub-Saharan Africa. The care and support of
HIV/AIDS patients often fall on older parents and
grandparents. 
A study in Zimbabwe found that older people were
the main caregivers, either of the terminally ill or of
the orphans whose parents had died of AIDS.2
Caregivers faced a range of problems, including loss of
financial support; lack of food and clothing; limited
access to affordable health services; inability to pay
school fees; diminished livelihood opportunities; and
stigmatization of the disease (even from health person-
nel). Similar findings have been reported in Uganda.3
The Zimbabwean study found that the health of older
caregivers had often suffered, with many under serious
physical and emotional stress and suffering from physi-
cal violence and abuse resulting from accusations of
witchcraft. Respondents had many serious concerns, as
voiced by a 62-year-old woman, guardian of three
grandchildren: “I am so afraid of what the future has
in store for these orphans. If I were to die and leave
them, who would look after them?” 
A 59-year-old woman in Mbare, Zimbabwe, who
cared for her children before they died and now cares
for seven orphaned grandchildren, explained: “The
person with AIDS is very sick and at times loses his/her
mind. When this happens, it becomes impossible to
provide effective care, as the sick person may be abu-
sive and violent.”
While HIV/AIDS now affects sub-Saharan Africa
disproportionately, the epidemic is expected to place
a heavy burden on older caregivers in a number of
Asian countries, including Thailand, India,
Cambodia, China, and the Philippines. A Thai study
found that two-thirds of adults who died from
HIV/AIDS lived with or had moved near their par-
ents by the terminal stage of illness.4 Seventy percent
of these adults received at least some care from a
parent or other older-generation relative. Such
extensive involvement of older caregivers may serve
as a model for planning public health programs in
other less developed nations—targeting older people
with caretaker education and socioeconomic support
of people living with HIV. 
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population and individual aging, per-
haps most important with regard to
marital status and living arrange-
ments. Family members are the main
source of emotional and economic
support for older people in less devel-
oped countries, although some gov-
ernments have assumed a larger share
of the economic responsibilities.
The primary reason there are many
more women than men at older ages is
that men have higher death rates than
women at all ages. Although about 105
boys are born per 100 girls in most
populations, women usually begin to
outnumber men between ages 30 and
40. The female numerical advantage
increases with age. A precise explana-
tion of why women live longer than
men still eludes scientists because it
involves the complex interplay of bio-
logical, social, and behavioral condi-
tions. Greater exposure of males to
risk factors such as tobacco and alco-
hol use and occupational hazards is
cited as one source of higher male
mortality rates. If this is true, the gap
in life expectancy should have nar-
rowed as women increased their use of
tobacco and alcohol and their partici-
pation in the labor force. Data from
industrialized countries still show no
clear pattern of change. The gender
gap is widening in much of eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union,
while it is narrowing in most other
countries. In the United States, for
example, life expectancy at birth
increased 4.4 years for males and 2.3
years for females between 1980 and
2002, narrowing the gender gap from
7.5 to 5.4 years. But in some nations
with high overall life expectancy (for
example Japan, Greece, and Iceland),
gains in female longevity continue to
outpace those of males.
Sex Ratios 
In most countries of the world, the
ratio of men to women at older ages
is well below 100. Ukraine’s sex ratio
of 50 men per 100 women ages 65
and older is an extreme example,
partly attributable to the lingering
effects of high male mortality during
World War II. More developed coun-
tries tend to have lower sex ratios
among their older populations than
do less developed countries, reflect-
ing the wider gender differentials in
life expectancies at birth in more
developed countries (see Table 4). 
In the future, sex ratios at older
ages are projected to move in oppo-
site directions in the more developed
and less developed regions. These
ratios are expected to increase in the
next few decades in many industrial-
ized countries as their life expectancy
gender gap narrows. The opposite
trend is anticipated in less developed
countries. Given the small average
gender gap in life expectancy in less
developed countries relative to more
developed nations, most demogra-
phers expect to see a widening of the
female/male difference in upcoming
decades, along the lines of the histori-
cal trend in industrialized nations.
Many less developed countries are
experiencing increases in alcohol and
tobacco consumption and vehicular
and industrial accidents—all of which
tend, at least initially, to adversely
affect men more than women. 
Education is also related to the
gender gap. As women “catch up” to
men in terms of educational attain-
ment, female survival and health sta-
tus may improve.32 Regardless of the
projected trends, women are expect-
ed to make up the majority of the
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Table 4
Sex Ratio for People Age 65 or Older in 20 
Countries, 2004
More developed countries Less developed countries
Australia 79 Bangladesh 117
Bulgaria 72 Brazil 70
France 69 Ethiopia 84
Germany 68 Fiji 85
Italy 71 Ghana 89
Poland 62 Honduras 90
Russia 46 India 103
Ukraine 51 Iran 98
United Kingdom 74 Mexico 84
United States 71 Zambia 79
Note: The sex ratio reflects the number of men per 100 women in the 65-and-older age group.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base (www.census.gov/ipc/www/
idbnew.html, accessed Dec. 12, 2004).
world’s older population throughout
the 21st century. Continuing or grow-
ing disparities in sex ratios mean that
many of the challenges and problems
faced by older people of today and
tomorrow are, in essence, challenges
and problems faced by older women.
Marital Status
Married people, particularly married
men, enjoy healthier and longer lives
than their unmarried counterparts. A
recent study of the U.S. noninstitution-
alized population found that married
adults were healthier than unmarried
adults within every population group
(including age, sex, race, or ethnic
groups) and within groups with similar
health indicators (whether they were
smokers, disabled, or physically inac-
tive, for example). The only negative
health indicator for which married
adults had a higher prevalence was
being overweight or obese.33
Older married couples also tend to
be more financially secure than
unmarried people. Married older peo-
ple are less likely to enter a nursing
home because their spouses are often
available to care for them in case of ill-
ness or disability. Changes in marital
status at older ages can affect pension
potential, retirement income, and an
individual’s social support network;
older widowed men, in particular, may
lose contact with much of their sup-
port network after their wives die. By
contrast, widowed women tend to
maintain their support network after
the death of a spouse. In almost every
society, older men are likely to be mar-
ried and older women are likely to be
widowed. For both men and women,
the proportion married decreases with
older age and the proportion widowed
increases (see Figure 6). 
Gender differences in marital sta-
tus reflect the interplay of several fac-
tors. First and most obvious is the sex
difference in longevity: Women live
longer than men. Second, women
tend to marry men older than them-
selves which, combined with the sex
difference in life expectancy, increas-
es the chance that a woman’s hus-
band will die before she does.
Furthermore, older widowed men
have higher remarriage rates than
older widowed women in many coun-
tries, often as a function of cultural
norms.34 Thus, women are more like-
ly than men to lose their spouse and
less likely to remarry if they are wid-
owed. This preponderance of single
women in older ages has important
economic consequences for individu-
als and societies. Longitudinal data
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Source: Compiled by the U.S. Census Bureau from national sources.
Figure 6
Percent Widowed Among Older Australians, Malaysians, and Croatians, Circa 2000
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from Germany and the United States
have revealed that, although the
poverty rate is lower in Germany than
in the United States, women in both
nations tend to experience a decline
in living standards when they become
widows, and many fall into poverty
because they lose their husband’s
pension support.35
Changes in Marriage and
Childbearing
Globally, the share of older men and
women who are married has
increased slightly and the proportion
who are widowed has decreased dur-
ing the past 30 years. Much of this
change is attributable to improved
joint survival of husbands and wives.
In most countries relatively few older
people have never married: 5 percent
or fewer older men and 10 percent or
fewer women. The percentages are
somewhat higher in parts of Europe,
where World War II deaths shrank the
pool of potential husbands when
today’s older women were of prime
marriage age. Above-average propor-
tions of older people in several Latin
American and Caribbean nations also
are never married, but this largely
reflects the prevalence of consensual
unions in those societies. While the
category “consensual union” is widely
used in census tabulations in these
countries, some people who are living
(or who have lived) in a consensual
union are likely to report themselves
as never married.
In most countries, a relatively small
proportion of older people are
divorced, because divorce was less
socially acceptable for this earlier gen-
eration. The number and percentage
of older divorcees will increase as
younger cohorts with higher divorce
rates reach older age.36 In the United
States, for example, 9 percent of peo-
ple ages 65 and older were divorced
or separated in 2003, compared with
17 percent of people 55 to 64 and 19
percent people 45 to 54. The chang-
ing marital composition of the older
population as these younger cohorts
reach age 65 will affect the nature
and types of support services that
both families and governments may
need to provide.37
Increases in childlessness will also
affect future caregiving demands for
older people. In the United States, for
example, the likelihood of being
childless among women ages 40 to 44
nearly doubled between 1980 and
2000 (from 10 percent to 19 percent).
Childlessness is common in Europe,
and is increasing in Latin America
and Southeast Asia. Some childless-
ness is involuntary, occurring because
of marital disruption, birth limitation
policies, or infecundity, loss of chil-
dren to HIV/AIDS or other health
problems. But increasingly, people are
choosing not to have any children,
reflecting lower marriage rates and
cultural changes that make childless-
ness more socially acceptable. Because
children often provide support for
their parents, trends in childlessness
will be an important determinant of
future elder-care arrangements.
Educational Differences
While literacy has increased through-
out the world, many older people,
particularly women and the oldest
old, grew up with few educational
opportunities. In some less devel-
oped countries, the vast majority of
older residents, particularly women,
are illiterate.
In some more developed coun-
tries, younger cohorts are more than
twice as likely as older people to have
completed secondary education. In
less developed countries, the differ-
ence between younger and older
cohorts is even more striking. The lat-
est census data for Bolivia indicate,
for example, that women ages 25 to
44 were more than five times as likely
as women age 65 or older to have
completed secondary education. 
Younger women in many countries
now complete secondary education at
higher rates than do men, and in
some nations young women are
about as likely as young men to
attend college.38 Thus, the disadvan-
tages that older women face because
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they have lower levels of education
than men should abate as today’s
older populations are replaced by
more educated cohorts. 
While older people in the future
will be more educated, the high
level of illiteracy among today’s
older population perpetuates many
social and economic disadvantages.
A lack of written proof of age, for
example, often is enough to bar
older people from defending their
rights to property.39
Intergenerational
Relationships
Intergenerational relationships strictly
refer to interactions and relationships
between parents, children, grandpar-
ents, and grandchildren at the
microsocial level. Within families,
intergenerational relations often deter-
mine the willingness and even the abil-
ity of families to provide care and sup-
port for their older members. These
relations also affect intergenerational
transfers of wealth. Intergenerational
relations are codified in some soci-
eties, especially in Asia, with reciprocal
duties between generations viewed as a
mutual obligation. These obligations
are most readily identified as filial 
piety and, in a more extreme form,
ancestor worship.40
The expectation that people will
care for their older relatives is not
unique to Asia; almost every society
has a similar, if less formal, under-
standing of the importance of family
relations and the value of older peo-
ple. While some social analysts suggest
that vertical family bonds—tying
together different generations—have
weakened over recent decades, this
suggestion has been refuted by
research findings in many countries.41
Indeed, greater longevity actually
makes bonds among adults more
important than in the past and, while
direct contact between generations
may have lessened, indirect contacts
are as strong as ever. A heated debate
has emerged in many countries about
the so-called “decline of the family.”
Some sociologists argue the family has
been stripped down to its bare essen-
tials: just two generations and two
functions (childbearing and financial
and emotional support for nuclear
family members). Other analysts argue
that, while families have changed over
the last century, population aging has
actually extended families across gen-
erations and expanded their support
functions over longer periods.42
Intergenerational relations can be
viewed along two axes: solidarity and
conflict. Most studies have focused on
the solidarity component, which is
assumed to remain strong even if
social factors such as smaller family
size, high residential mobility, and
urbanization make intergenerational
bonds more difficult to maintain.
Researchers recognize various positive
aspects of social and familial cohesion,
interaction, and sentiment associated
with solidarity. Conflict in intergenera-
tional relations has been less thor-
oughly studied, but research suggests
that families alternate between conflict
and competition during some periods
and stability, order, and cooperation
during other periods.
Family Structure
The nature of family life and inter-
generational relations strongly
depends on the structure of a family:
whether one has a spouse, children,
grandchildren, siblings, or surviving
parents or grandparents. As seen ear-
lier, many women worldwide have a
husband or partner until their 60s,
when they become widows. Most
older people have children and many
have grandchildren. As many as 80
percent also have siblings, although
this percentage is steadily dropping as
family size is falling. In countries with
very low birth rates, future genera-
tions of adults and older people will
have few if any siblings.
The picture of the nuclear family
that stays together through life is still
the norm in most countries, but this
norm is changing. Among the baby-
boom generation in the West, there is
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A majority of
older people in
many countries
are illiterate.
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a wide variety of family forms and
lifestyles, reflecting rising rates of
divorce and remarriage, delayed mar-
riage, and increasing percentages of
never-married and childless adults as
well as greater labor force participa-
tion among women.
The global trend toward fewer chil-
dren means fewer potential caregivers
for older parents. The word “poten-
tial” is important, because simulations
of future support scenarios have
shown that fertility decline alone is
not likely to result in the collapse of a
traditional support system.43 Added
years of life prolong relationships
with others: parents, grandparents,
children, and grandchildren. In 2000,
a 50-year-old American had an esti-
mated 80 percent chance of having at
least one parent alive and a 27 per-
cent chance of having both alive.44
Living Arrangements
Living arrangements take on special
importance with regard to older peo-
ple, because living arrangements
reflect both the nature of accommo-
dation required and the need for
community or institutional long-term
care. Living arrangements often
reflect sociocultural preferences—for
example, a preference for living in
nuclear-family households versus liv-
ing in an extended-family house-
hold—or the propensity of society to
allow, encourage, and support institu-
tionalization of older people. Living
arrangements also reflect the desire
and ability of many older people to
live independently.
Large proportions of older people
live alone in many industrialized coun-
tries. Well over one-third live alone in
Sweden, the United Kingdom,
Finland, and Denmark, and the pro-
portion is higher in the oldest age
groups. Figure 7, based on Canadian
census data, demonstrates how the
increase in the number of older peo-
ple living alone has largely been fueled
by women. Older-person-only house-
holds (especially unmarried women)
are increasingly common. In the
United Kingdom, for example, about
15 percent of all households in the
1990s were single pensioners living
alone. However, the most common
“older household” in many Western
countries consists of two older people.
In a comparison of 13 European coun-
tries in the 1990s, between 29 percent
and 45 percent of all older people
lived with another person age 65 or
older.45 The Berlin Aging Study, which
looks at people in West Berlin age 70
or older, found that almost 62 percent
were living alone in the 1990s, 25 per-
cent lived with a spouse or partner,
and 8 percent lived in nursing homes
or other institutional arrangements.
Among those age 85 or older, the lat-
ter figure was 19 percent.46
At one time, living alone was
thought to indicate social isolation or
family abandonment of older people.
However, research in more developed
countries consistently shows that
older people prefer to reside in their
own homes and communities, even if
that means living alone. The growth
of households consisting of one older
person has been fueled by a combina-
tion of factors: greater longevity;
increases in benefits and pensions; ris-
ing home ownership levels; more
elder-friendly housing; greater
emphasis on care in the community;
increased availability of community
support; and reduced public financ-
ing for living in nursing homes. 
Multigenerational households have
been declining in more developed
countries, but two- and three-genera-
tion households are still the norm in
many less developed countries. Most
studies in less developed countries
indicate that older people want to live
with their children or at least close to
them. A four-country review of living
arrangements and support for older
people in Southeast Asia found that
between 69 percent and 85 percent of
people age 60 or older in those coun-
tries lived with their children in the
mid-1990s, although the percentage
had declined slightly since the 1980s
in at least three of the countries.47
The percentages who were living
alone or with a spouse only were
small—6 percent or less. But many
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older people who lived apart from
their children often lived close by and
saw them on a daily basis. The four-
country study concluded that the
enormous socioeconomic changes in
the region over the past few decades
have not yet significantly affected tra-
ditional living arrangements.
However, changes are becoming evi-
dent in East Asian countries such as
Hong Kong, China, Korea, and Japan,
where significant numbers of older
people live alone and the share living
with children is falling rapidly (see
Figure 8). 
In patrilineal systems such as
found in northern Vietnam, an older
parent is much more likely to live
with a married son than with a mar-
ried daughter. The reverse is true in
the Philippines and Thailand, where
the parent would be more likely to
live with a married daughter than a
married son.
Although older people in less
developed countries appear to have
strong family support, several trends
concern social scientists. The first
trend relates to specific groups such
as unmarried older women or widows
without any children, who can be left
with little support and nowhere to live
if extended family members will not
take them in. The changing house-
hold structures and living arrange-
ments in high HIV/AIDS-prevalence
areas can leave many orphans depen-
dent on older grandparents. Some
social scientists are also concerned
about the effects of urbanization and
modernization on family life—with
some worried that these changes will
undermine traditional family support
systems for older people.48
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Source: Statistics Canada, national census data.
Figure 7
Older Canadians Living Alone, 1961 to 2001
*Includes small numbers living in unspecified arrangements.
Sources: M. Atoh, “Who Takes Care of Children and the Elderly in an Aging Society?” (October 1998); and
Japan National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, “Housing With Seniors: 1975–-2010”
(www.jinjapan.org/insight/html/focus10/page08.html, accessed March 13, 2003). 
Figure 8
Living Arrangements of Older Japanese, 1960 to 2010
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Long-term care (LTC) for older
people has become a key issue
throughout the world. LTC involves a
range of support mechanisms, includ-
ing nursing and assistance in the
home, various forms of community
care and day care, residential care, and
long-stay hospitals and similar institu-
tions.49 Western societies have moved
away from institutional residential care
except when absolutely necessary for
medical or social reasons. One recent
study of 10 European nations suggest-
ed that the share of older people in
residential care ranged from just
under 4 percent in Germany to more
than 9 percent in Denmark and
Norway.50 On average, about 6 percent
of older people in the more developed
world live in residential care communi-
ties and nursing homes at any point in
time, although a much higher percent-
age of older people may expect to
spend some time in an institutional
setting before they die. 
Aging in place and care in the commu-
nity have become watch-phrases for
policy in many countries. These con-
cepts imply that older people should
be able to live in their own homes or
in small institutions as long as possi-
ble and that, while institutional care
should be available when necessary, it
should be a last resort. Care in the
community and aging in place may
remain key policy levers if more older
people live longer and healthier lives.
However, these options require that
appropriate social and medical sup-
port are available in the community
for older people and their families
and that residential settings and local
environments are designed to accom-
modate the special needs of people
with limited physical functioning and
mobility. Too often, these design
aspects are neglected in planning and
require considerable expense to
install retrospectively.
Caregiving
Caregiving is usually characterized as
either formal or informal, although
the distinction between the two can at
times be artificial. Formal care or sup-
port generally comes from paid pro-
fessionals and public and private ser-
vices set up specifically to provide a
service such as home nursing, home
help, or counseling. Some services—
such as meals-on-wheels programs for
house-bound older people—are for-
mally organized but often delivered
partly by volunteers, making these
programs a combination of formal
and informal support. Informal care is
care provided by relatives, friends,
and neighbors to older people and
their families. Much informal care is
provided by other older people, and
is instrumental (such as help with
cooking, cleaning, and shopping);
personal (help with eating or toilet-
ing); and emotional (personal visits
and communication). Such care is
extremely important but difficult to
quantify because many activities may
not be recognized by the giver or
receiver as “support” or “care.” Family
members are the major providers of
informal support: daughters and
daughters-in-law are often the primary
caregivers. Today, however, increasing
joint survivorship at older ages means
that the spouse (usually the wife)
rather than an adult daughter often is
the primary informal caregiver. While
many older people receive financial
and other support from adult chil-
dren, support often is reciprocal. In
countries with well-established pen-
sion programs, many older adults give
support and care to their children
and grandchildren. Older people in
less developed countries are less likely
to provide financial help to younger
people, but often contribute signifi-
cantly to family well-being in many
ways, ranging from socialization to
housekeeping to child care.
Work, Retirement,
and Well-Being
No set of issues has galvanized public
discourse about aging more than
those surrounding work, retirement,
and economic security in old age. In
eastern Europe’s transitional
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Wealthier
countries tend 
to have much
lower labor force
participation
among older
residents.
economies, and indeed in much of
the less developed world, govern-
ments increasingly seek to define a
balance between public and private
social security systems. The precari-
ousness of old-age security can be
seen in stagnant and declining real
pensions in transitional economies, in
the dire fate of pensioners during the
collapse of Argentina’s economy in
2001, in the surprisingly high poverty
rates among older Japanese, and per-
haps most vividly in the lack of social
safety nets for a majority of older peo-
ple in Africa and Asia.
Labor Force Participation
Labor force participation declines
with age, especially after age 50, but
work patterns for older people vary
among and within countries (see Box
5, page 30). Older people in more
developed countries are generally less
likely to work than those in less devel-
oped countries. Only 2 percent of
men age 65 or older participate in
the labor force in some more devel-
oped countries, whereas more than
one-half are economically active in
certain less developed countries.
National differences in labor force
activity are associated with societal
wealth: Wealthier countries tend to
have much lower labor force partici-
pation rates among older residents
than do low-income countries.51
Labor force participation rates for
older men declined in more devel-
oped countries in recent decades.
One compilation of data for 16
nations showed especially pro-
nounced declines in participation for
men in their early 60s. In the early
1970s, well over half of men ages 60
to 64 were still working in a majority
of countries. By the late 1990s, only
four of the 16 countries—Japan, New
Zealand, Sweden, and the United
States—had male participation rates
over 50 percent in this age group.52
Labor force participation rates fell
below 10 percent among the 65-and-
older age group in most of the coun-
tries. Financial incentives for early
retirement have enabled many older
workers to leave the labor force. Also,
new technologies have increased the
value of a recently trained labor force
relative to older workers. And in
countries with persistently high
unemployment, older workers may be
pressured to leave the labor force to
make room for younger workers. 
The decline in labor force participa-
tion among older workers may have
halted. A report from the Organisation
for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) found a slight
increase in employment rates for men
in their late 50s and early 60s in the
late 1990s in the United States and the
Netherlands, and a cessation of the
long-term decline in several other
OECD countries. The report suggests
that the increase was related to an eco-
nomic upturn in the late 1990s.53
Older women have had different
labor force patterns than older men.
In many industrialized countries,
female participation rates have
increased for almost all adult age
groups up to age 60. The increase was
sharp in some countries. In New
Zealand, for example, 60 percent of
women ages 55 to 59 were economi-
cally active in 1998, up from 28 per-
cent in 1971. While female participa-
tion was increasing at younger ages,
nearly all more developed countries
saw a decrease among older women
between the early 1970s and the late
1990s. Small proportions (typically 4
percent or less) of older women are
economically active in more devel-
oped nations.
Older men and women in less
developed countries are much more
likely to work than those in industrial-
ized nations. Older people in predomi-
nantly rural agrarian societies often
work out of necessity—retirement may
be a luxury reserved for urban elites.
In nations as diverse as Bangladesh,
Indonesia, Jamaica, Mexico, Pakistan,
and Zimbabwe, more than 50 percent
of all older men are considered eco-
nomically active. The economic activity
of women tends to be underreported,
particularly in less developed countries
where much of the work that women
engage in is not captured in censuses
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In more developed countries, retirement from the
workforce occurred almost exclusively at a regulated
age until the 1950s; older workers had little possibility
of receiving a pension prior to the designated retire-
ment age. Since then, countries have adopted a wide
range of approaches to providing old age security, and
people have a wider array of routes to retirement. 
Part-time work is one option that appeals to many
older workers because it enables them to remain
active in the labor force while pursuing leisure activi-
ties. But the opportunities for part-time work vary
tremendously among countries. In nine more devel-
oped countries, the prevalence of part-time employ-
ment among working men ages 60 to 64 ranged from
less than 8 percent in Italy and Germany to more than
35 percent in Sweden and the Netherlands.1
Older working women are much more likely than
older men to be involved in part-time work. In
Australia, three-fourths of women ages 65 and older
who were economically active in 1999 worked part-
time, compared with fewer than half of economically
active older men. A study of 15 European Union
countries showed that 41 percent of working women
ages 55 to 64 were in part-time positions in 1998,
compared with just 8 percent of working men in that
age group.2 The rate of part-time work for people
nearing retirement generally was increasing in the
1990s. However, part-time workers often represent a
small fraction of the older population.
Disability programs have provided another path to
retirement for older workers. Economic recessions
and high unemployment in Europe in recent decades
led some governments (including Germany, the
Netherlands, and Sweden) to enable early retirement
via relaxed disability criteria and generous long-term
sickness benefits. Wide variations in national pro-
grams produced enormous differences in retirement
patterns; among 16 European countries in the mid-
1990s, the percentage of older retired men who
retired because of illness or disability ranged from 2
percent in Portugal to 29 percent in Switzerland. 
Unemployment also has been seen as a bridge to
retirement. Older workers typically have low levels of
unemployment compared with younger workers, but
if older workers become unemployed, they tend to
remain unemployed longer than younger workers.
OECD data for several wealthy countries show that
well over half of unemployed people age 55 or older
were unemployed for more than one year. Many enter
the ranks of “discouraged workers,” people who are
no longer looking for work because they think there is
no work available or because they do not know where
to look. In some countries, older workers may feel
excluded from the labor force because of changes in
occupational structure and the need for a more-edu-
cated workforce that favors younger workers. 
One comparison of 13 countries indicated that
people ages 55 to 64 accounted for a disproportionate
share of discouraged workers, especially in the United
Kingdom, where more than two-thirds of all discour-
aged male workers were ages 55 to 64. In countries
with trend data, discouraged older workers were more
numerous in the 1990s than in the 1980s. Because of
the difficulties older people face in obtaining a new
job, discouragement often becomes a transition from
unemployment to retirement.
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Box 5
The Transition to Retirement
and labor force surveys, or is not con-
sidered economic activity. Older
women in less developed societies, for
example, often are involved in subsis-
tence agriculture or household indus-
tries, neither of which is well docu-
mented by conventional data collec-
tion methods. 
Most older workers in less devel-
oped countries work in agriculture.
Agriculture remains a major employ-
er of older people, even in many
more-developed countries. In 1995 in
Japan, one-third of all older workers
were engaged in agriculture. Data for
23 OECD countries show that the
ratio of workers age 55 or older to
workers below age 55 is generally
much higher in agriculture, hunting,
and forestry than in any other goods-
producing or service sector.54
Retirement Systems
Public pension systems developed
largely because families found it
increasingly difficult to support their
older and infirm relatives. Just 33
countries had old age, disability, and
survivors programs in 1940, compared
with more than 165 countries in 2000.
In response to general economic con-
ditions, changes in welfare philosophy,
and private pension trends over the
past several decades, many industrial-
ized nations lowered the age at which
people become fully entitled to public
pension benefits. The proliferation of
early retirement schemes has increased
the number and usually the propor-
tion of older workers who take advan-
tage of such programs.
Coverage
Mandatory old-age pension plans now
cover more than 90 percent of the
labor force in most industrialized
countries. Governments are responsi-
ble for mandating, financing, manag-
ing, and insuring public pensions.
Public pension plans usually offer
benefits that are not tied to individual
contributions, but are financed by
payroll taxes. This arrangement is
commonly referred to as a “pay-as-
you-go” system because taxes on work-
ing adults finance the pension pay-
ments of people who are retired. 
Most pay-as-you-go systems in indus-
trialized countries initially promised
generous benefits. When first estab-
lished, these programs were based on
a small number of pensioners relative
to a large number of contributors
(workers). As systems matured, ratios
of pensioners to contributors grew
and in some countries became unsus-
tainable, particularly during periods
of economic stagnation. One result
was the development of private pen-
sion systems to complement public sys-
tems. Other measures implemented
or considered have included increas-
ing worker contribution rates, restruc-
turing or reducing benefits, and rais-
ing the minimum age of retirement.55
In less developed countries, public
pension systems typically cover a much
smaller fraction of workers. Even eco-
nomically vibrant societies such as
Malaysia and Thailand offer no pub-
licly supported, comprehensive retire-
ment pension scheme. Governments
that do offer coverage often restrict it
to certain workers such as civil ser-
vants, military personnel, and employ-
ees in the formal economic sector.
Rural, predominantly agricultural
workers have little or no pension cov-
erage in much of the less developed
world, although some governments
have taken steps to address this situa-
tion.56 Each state in India, for example,
has implemented an old-age pension
scheme for destitute people with no
source of income and no family sup-
port. In addition to these state
schemes, the Indian government has
developed a means-tested National
Social Assistance Programme that
seeks to provide uniformly available
social protection throughout the coun-
try. While pension amounts are mini-
mal and coverage far from universal,
the system provides a foundation on
which to expand future coverage. 
Informal (usually family) systems
provide the bulk of social support for
older individuals in many countries,
particularly in Africa and South Asia.
As economies expand and nations
urbanize, informal support systems,
such as extended family care and
mutual aid societies, have tended to
weaken. Expanding the older popula-
tion served by formal systems while
maintaining the existing informal
support mechanisms has become a
major challenge for governments in
less developed nations.
Pension Reform
A number of factors have converged
to make pension reform a contentious
political issue. Increased longevity and
early retirement mean that demo-
graphic change alone could double
retiree–worker ratios in many coun-
tries over the next 30 years.
Economists have expressed concerns
about declining savings rates, while
politicians and the general public
have been reluctant to embrace
increased payroll taxes and higher
retirement ages.57 With the cost of
public pensions absorbing upwards of
15 percent of GDP in some countries,
there is an emerging consensus that
pension systems should be revamped
to rely less on traditional public-bene-
fit formulas and to require more from
private accounts and individual-work-
er savings.58 During the last decade,
dozens of books and monographs
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have debated the often-complex fiscal
pros and cons of privatization. There
also are strong philosophical (some
would say ethical) aspects to the
debate. Proponents of privatization
seek to promote individual responsi-
bility and reduce the role of govern-
ment. Other analysts stress that tradi-
tional public pension systems are
social insurance programs based on
the notion of collective responsibility.
Beyond the rhetoric, two facts stand
out: First, traditional public programs
are not set in stone and are periodical-
ly reformed to resolve legislated
financing problems. Second, there is
nevertheless a clear trend toward pri-
vatizing public systems. Approximately
30 nations have privatized at least a
portion of their public systems, and
privatization has been more common
in countries with well-developed pub-
lic systems that cover a large percent-
age of workers. 
Privatization of pensions can take
many forms, and it can coexist with
strong public programs. One progres-
sive idea, developed by the Switzer-
land-based Geneva Association, pro-
motes the concept of Four Pillars of
Support. In many countries, pension
funding rests on two or three pillars: a
public pension based on pay-as-you-go
funding; a supplemental or mandato-
ry occupational pension (common in
some European nations) that often is
fully funded; and individual savings,
which may include personal invest-
ments and life insurance. The Geneva
Association proposes a fourth pillar
based on a new design for retirement
that encourages continued economic
activity (either full-time or part-time)
by older people, and incorporates the
concept of gradual retirement instead
of early retirement.59 Crossnational
research on labor force participation
at older ages has shown that levels of
participation are a consequence
(intended or unintended) of retire-
ment provisions and/or tax policy.60
The financial structure of national
social security systems may reward
early retirement, and attempts to
encourage increased labor force par-
ticipation at older ages may be largely
contingent upon politically difficult
changes in these systems.
Successful Aging
Aging is not merely a matter of accu-
mulating years but also, as a popular
catch-phrase states, a process of
“adding life to years, not years to life.”
People grow old in a social and eco-
nomic context that affects their psy-
chosocial development: their feelings
of self-esteem, value, and place in
family and society. These factors have
a combined effect on the morale of
older people, and a number of mod-
els have been developed to explain
why some people remain more active
and healthier at older ages than other
people. These are generalized models
and cannot account for differences in
the genetic makeup of individuals,
although the models can identify fac-
tors that favor healthy lifestyles and
ways in which a society can assist its
members to grow old with dignity and
comfort. Underpinning these con-
cepts or models are several decades of
study by gerontologists who have
offered a number of social theories of
aging (see Box 6).
The concept of successful aging has
recently attracted a great deal of poli-
cy and research attention and is relat-
ed to the broad issues of coping and
adaptation in later life. Growing num-
bers of older people do not exhibit
the chronic health problems and
declining cognitive skills that were
assumed to accompany aging.
Successful aging is viewed as maximiz-
ing desired outcomes and minimizing
undesired ones. As demonstrated in
the Berlin Aging Study, adaptation is
a key component to successful aging:
Older adults can compensate for loss-
es and declines and retain the poten-
tial for further growth. Aging experts
John Rowe and Robert Kahn view suc-
cessful aging as the confluence of
three functions: decreasing the risk of
diseases and disease-related disability;
maintaining physical and mental
functioning; and being actively
engaged with life (see Figure 9, page
34).61 There is debate, however, about
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Theory building—the cumulative development
of explanation and understanding of observa-
tions and findings—lies at the core of scientific
inquiry and knowledge. In areas such as social
gerontology, social theories are essential for
providing coherent and valid bases for policies,
programs, and activities. Social theories are
not proved or disproved; rather, they represent
a cumulative and evolutionary understanding
as parts of the explanations are better under-
stood, improved, or rejected.
Role theory is one of the oldest social
gerontological theories, dating back to the
1940s.1 Individuals play a variety of roles dur-
ing their lives—child, adult, spouse, parent,
employer, employee, grandparent, retiree.
Roles are often sequential, some are concur-
rent, and individuals lose and gain roles
throughout life. Chronological age often
determines some changes (such as attaining
voting age or retirement age), but age
norms—assumptions that people should do
or cease certain activities at certain ages—
underpin much of role theory. Some role
images and changes can be challenged legally
(such as formal retirement ages) or by public
perceptions (older people as athletes, astro-
nauts, entertainers, and other positive
images).
Activity theory (from the 1960s) suggests
that older people who take on a large number
and variety of activities and roles will have a
more positive older age, adjust to aging better,
and be more satisfied with their lives.2 Activity
theory tends to promote old age as a social
problem or issue that individuals can tackle. A
differing perspective to this was disengagement
theory, which found a mutual withdrawal
between the older person and society.3
Disengagement theory sees society withdraw-
ing from the aging person as much as the
older person withdrawing from society, and
disengagement is viewed as adaptive behavior.
Assumptions about disengagement of older
people—which was seen by some as unavoid-
able and universal—have prompted much
debate, research, and modification. 
Continuity theory holds that middle-aged
and older adults often attempt to preserve
ties with their own past experiences by substi-
tuting new roles that are similar to lost ones.4
The theory suggests that people are most sat-
isfied in their older years when their new
roles and activities are consistent with previ-
ous experiences. This approach tends to
emphasize individual behavior and neglects
the societal constraints that deter older peo-
ple from continuing some activities, but it
nevertheless looks positively at continuation
of activities such as sports, religion, reading,
or teaching. 
While these theories have been sometimes
portrayed as challenging one another, they
also represent an evolution of understanding
of aging and the place of older people in soci-
ety. A number of alternative and additional
theories have focused on the interaction
between an individual and the environment.5
The subculture of aging theory views older
people as maintaining their self-concepts and
identities through membership in social
groups. Subcultures might form within politi-
cal, religious, and professional groups, or from
“membership” that accrues from living in, say,
a retirement home or retirement community.
Within such potentially closed communities,
residents may act and behave in collective ways
that perhaps they would not do if living in the
wider community. 
Other more general theories such as mod-
ernization theory discuss negative effects on
the roles and status of older people if their
knowledge, traits, and skills are deemed less
relevant or valuable as modernization pro-
ceeds. Exchange theory helps explain why
most older people, in spite of reduced
resources, seek to maintain some degree of
reciprocity while remaining independent and
active. Feminist gerontology criticizes the male-
centered views inherent in much theory on
aging, even though older people are predomi-
nantly women.6
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Box 6
Social Theories of Aging
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how those who age successfully differ
from others and about the role of
external factors in the process.62
In addition to successful aging, con-
cepts such as productive aging (the abil-
ity to contribute directly and indirectly
in older age) and healthy aging (the
ability to remain physically and men-
tally fit) have been identified. These
concepts come together in the WHO’s
policy framework of active aging devel-
oped between the late 1990s and
2002.63 The word “active” refers to
continuing participation in social, eco-
nomic, cultural, spiritual, and civic
affairs, not just being physically or eco-
nomically active. Active aging encom-
passes those who have retired as well
as people who are frail, disabled, or in
need of care; and it takes place within
a broad social context of friends, fami-
ly, neighbors, associates, and the work-
place. Active aging recognizes the
UN’s principles of independence, par-
ticipation, dignity, care and self-fulfill-
ment. It shifts strategic planning away
from a needs-based approach (which
implies older people are passive recip-
ients) to a rights-based approach of
equality and opportunity. The WHO
advocates a life-course approach to
active aging that recognizes older peo-
ple not as a homogeneous group but
as individuals who, collectively, are as
diverse as younger members of a soci-
ety. The strategy promotes supportive
environments and fosters healthy life
choices at all stages of life. Finally, it
recognizes that a collective approach
to aging and older people will ulti-
mately determine how we and our
children and grandchildren experi-
ence life in later years. 
Longer-Term View
In most countries, but especially
those in less developed regions, eco-
nomic growth remains the priority;
social considerations take a back seat.
While economic development may
ultimately increase the ability of coun-
tries to support older people, devel-
opment and population aging inter-
act in numerous ways. 
The UN Economic and Social
Commission for Asia and the Pacific
elaborated these interactions in 1999
when it sponsored the first aging and
development plan for a less devel-
oped region, the Macau Plan of
Action on Ageing for Asia and the
Pacific.64 The plan explicitly notes
that population aging tends to
increase fiscal demands on govern-
ments, especially for income support,
health, and social services. In addi-
tion, the urbanization that almost
always accompanies development
tends to reduce traditional support
networks for older people at the same
time that labor markets have decreas-
ing demand for the skills and experi-
ence of older workers. The aging
cohorts in many less developed coun-
tries are an interim generation: They
are reaching retirement age before
gaining sufficient personal savings
and pensions and at the same time as
their traditional family support may
be withering.65 In this sense, popula-
tion aging can reduce the savings
available for national investment.
Some economists from more devel-
oped regions fear that the financial
burden of pensions and long-term
care for expanding retired popula-
tions may reduce the ability to invest
overseas and buy industrial goods
from less developed countries. 
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Source: Adapted from J.W. Rowe and R.L. Kahn,
The Gerontologist 37, no. 4 (1997): 433–40.
Figure 9
Model of Successful Aging
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Demographic aging has become a
global development issue. Economists,
however, may be overly pessimistic.
Family systems of care have proved
very resilient worldwide and, with a
modicum of formal help, may contin-
ue to support older relatives for
decades. Shoring up family systems
would entail reorienting investment
toward training and long-term care
assistance, but it could ultimately build
more supportive societies.66 Another
factor that could ease the financial
burden of aging is the incorporation
of pension needs in the development
strategies of international donor orga-
nizations. Less developed countries
that provide even a minimal pension
to a significant portion of their older
population have demonstrated that
pensions can ameliorate poverty.67 The
rising demand for imported labor in
the richer, demographically stagnant
countries is another potential source
of support for older people in less
developed countries. While such
demand may induce a brain drain
from less developed nations, it would
also generate an increasing flow of
remittances to older individuals. There
are other development opportunities
that aging populations can create, not
the least of which is in parts of Asia
called the “silver market,” the demand
for goods and services by older people
themselves.
Aging and National
Security 
The profound shifts in age structure
around the world have prompted a
reexamination of strategic and eco-
nomic thinking about national securi-
ty. Countries that are growing slowly
(or not at all) are experiencing
declines in the size of their younger
populations. While most of these
nations have shifted from manpower-
intensive to capital-intensive armed
forces, some analysts are concerned
about the future size and demographic
profile of defense forces. Countries
with high fertility rates, in contrast,
have a surplus of youth. Large armies
are a source of employment as well as
national strength, and countries at an
earlier level of demographic transition
are potentially destabilizing forces not
only vis-à-vis immediate neighbors but
to the world as a whole.68
The more worrisome long-term
security scenarios involve widening
budget deficits in more developed
countries. There is concern that high-
er spending on social programs will
increase interest rates and crowd out
private investment. Some analysts
argue that, as populations stabilize or
decline, the shrinking numbers of
workers and consumers may reduce
national GDP growth, asset values, sav-
ings rates, and currency values.
Consequently, tax revenues and the
values of mortgage-backed securities
will decline in some countries, with
ripple effects throughout the world.
The OECD, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the European
Commission, and other groups have
studied the influence of aging on the
economy. While the studies have dif-
ferent approaches and emphases, the
shared conclusion is that economic
growth will slow as populations age.69
Global Capital Flows
Whether population decline and slow-
er economic growth are twin evils for
social well-being is debatable and
beyond the scope of this report. The
“doom and gloom” scenarios of aging
painted by some analysts are coun-
tered by optimistic assessments from
other analysts. A sustained rise in pro-
ductivity, for example, could offset
many of the fiscal negatives men-
tioned above. If, as some claim, econ-
omists know very little about how
technological change occurs, then the
effects of aging populations on tech-
nological innovation are unknown.70
Considering the broader picture, ana-
lysts have begun to examine the
implications of population aging for
global capital flows. By the late 1990s,
the aging Japanese society had
become the world’s largest exporter
of capital.71 Simulations suggest that
there will be substantial capital flows
from rapidly aging countries such as
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Italy and Germany to the rest of the
world in the near future, although
the long-term impact of such flows
remains unclear.72
Looking further down the road,
IMF simulations foresee a turning
point between 2010 and 2030, when
Europe and North America become
capital importers of flows from today’s
less developed regions.73 If retired
baby boomers in wealthier countries
decide to sell off their stocks and
other assets as they age, standard eco-
nomic theory predicts that the price
of such assets will fall. Some
observers, however, believe that
“younger” countries will step in and
absorb any sell-off. Countries in less-
advanced stages of the demographic
transition have large segments of
their populations in the prime work-
ing ages, with the potential for high
levels of economic output and sav-
ings. Depending on the economic cli-
mate, this “demographic dividend”
has the potential to fuel growth and
capital accumulation, as it did in parts
of Asia during prior decades.74
Will Living Standards
Improve? 
Given the maturation of public pen-
sions systems, increased female labor
force participation, and the expand-
ed private pension schemes in indus-
trialized nations, older citizens in
these countries would be expected to
be better off economically than previ-
ous generations of older people.
Indeed, the OECD has concluded
that the economic picture for older
people has been stable or improved
in recent decades, both in absolute
terms and relative to younger popula-
tion groups. Poverty rates for older
people have declined in most
nations, as has the share of older
people among the poor. 
In the United States, real median
household income (adjusted for
household size) improved much
more for older people than for the
general population. And poverty
among people age 65 or older has
declined. One-third of all older U.S.
citizens were below the poverty line in
1960; by the mid-1990s, just 10 per-
cent were below poverty, lower than
the rate for children.75
There is a growing perception in
some countries that the older popula-
tion is faring better than other age
groups. However, the complexity of
measuring economic well-being often
precludes a definitive assessment, and
there is considerable concern about
the willingness and ability of house-
holds to adequately save for retire-
ment needs.76 The ongoing
Luxembourg Income Study reveals
substantial variation among countries
in poverty rates at older ages. One
comparison of nine countries found
that Canada, Germany, and Hungary
provided their older residents with
better overall protection from poverty
than the other six countries. These
overall figures may mask large disad-
vantages for specific groups within
countries—in particular, for older
women living alone.77
Age Waves
In spite of inevitable changes in polit-
ical regimes and economic uncertain-
ty, forecasters must sometimes peer
far into the future. The U.S. Social
Security Administration makes popu-
lation projections 75 years ahead; the
International Institute for Applied
Systems Analysis looks to the year
2100; and the UN Population Division
now produces population projections
for the next 300 years. While such
long-range scenarios are likely to be
confounded by unforeseen events,
they do provide broad planning tar-
gets. Some demographers have used
long-term projections to identify pat-
terns of population aging and raise
warning flags about potential conse-
quences. Demographer Ian Pool, for
example, argues that aging is not a
monotonic transitional process, but
rather the outcome of complex age
structural mutations that vary by
country. By plotting the changing size
of different age groups between 1950
and 2050, Pool paints a picture of
double or multiple population waves
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that result not just from declining fer-
tility rates, but from the timing of low
fertility (for example, during the
Great Depression, the World Wars,
and the baby bust following the baby
boom), from resurgences in fertility
during baby booms and baby-boom
echoes, and from the effects of trends
in migration and survival.78
The inexorable momentum of
population aging around the world
will likely become the most significant
demographic process of the 21st cen-
tury. Continuing shifts in population
age structure will require new social
sensitivities and innovative policy
responses. Demographic aging has
implications for a wide range of
human behavior, and researchers
increasingly recognize the need for
multidisciplinary approaches to the
aging process. Initiatives in North
America, Europe, and Asia that inte-
grate several salient domains of peo-
ple’s lives have created successful
prototypes for such interdisciplinary
studies. The next steps in understand-
ing the aging phenomenon will come
from a further integration of scientif-
ic inquiry, combining ideas from
biodemography, genomics, psycholo-
gy, and macroeconomics. 
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